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The Chinese public prosecution service, the procuracy, is modelled on the Soviet Union system 
and has been accorded the controversial function of supervising other legal institutions in the 
criminal justice system. Drawing upon my own empirical data on the prosecution of crime in 
China, this article critically examines the way the power of supervision operates from an 
internal perspective. It argues that the power of supervision has been used as an institutional 
asset to secure the interests of the procuracy by analysing its oversight of police investigations 
and court decisions, the way prosecutors perceive themselves, and the efficacy of the 
supervision in a comparative context. The current status of the procuracy dictates that it is 
unable to undertake the role of supervision to safeguard the criminal process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In his comparative study of prosecuting crime in Japan and the U.S, Johnson (2002) enumerates 
the valuable resources that Japanese prosecutors possess and argues that the authority enjoyed 
by them is unmatched elsewhere. 1 It is true that prosecutors in Japan benefit from a number of 
socio-political advantages (such as extensive discretionary power, low crime rates, light case-
loads, quiescent politics, enabling law and the absence of juries) in facilitating their prosecution 
of crime.2 However, when compared to their counterpart in China the prosecutorial power in 
Japan may still be overshadowed. Chinese prosecutors do not have the favourable resources 
they desire, yet they are accorded a supervisory function, which enables them to oversee all the 
law enforcement agencies, including the courts and the police. This supervisory role makes the 
Chinese prosecution service, in theory, the mightiest prosecution institution in the world.   
   The Chinese prosecution service, the People's Procuracy, is modelled on the procuracy 
system in the Soviet Union, which is not limited to a prosecution service, but is broadly defined 
as a legal supervisory body. 3  This supervisory role allows the procuracy to engage with all 
critical stages of the criminal process to ensure the legality of the performance of the criminal 
justice institutions. This supervisory function encompasses criminal case registration, 
investigations, trials, enforcement of criminal penalties, reviews of death penalty cases, 
enforcement of coercive measures, and compensation of victims. 4  These multiple roles have 
raised the question as to how the procuracy reconciles its own duties and relationships with the 
other core criminal justice institutions.  
    In China, the concept of the Iron Triangle, the coalition of the police, the procuracy and the 
judiciary, defines the three allies that dominate the criminal justice system. Against this 
background, the supervisory power of the procuracy is likely to create controversial dynamics 
within the tripartite relationship. Fionda (1995) observes that the relationship between public 
prosecutors and other key characters in the criminal justice system is subject to the underlying 
philosophy of the legal system and various causes of antagonism and friction. 5 Thus, exploring 
the operation of the Chinese procuracy provides an insight into intricate dynamics between the 
designated role of prosecutors and the quintessential characteristics of a given legal system. 
    This article examines this unique function of the procuracy in China and the way it exercises 
that power in criminal justice within a comparative context. It analyses the institutional 
                                                          
1 D. Johnson, The Japanese Way of Justice: Prosecuting Crime in Japan (2002) ch.1. 
2 However it is noted that Japan has introduced the Saiban-in system since 2009, in which six lay assessors and three judges 
share the role of finding facts and sentencing. See T Katsuta, 'Japan's Rejection of the American Criminal Jury' (2010) 58 
Am. J. Comp. L. 497. 
3 S. Shaoxia and G. Lixin, 'Lenin's Supervisory Theory of Law and Chinese Procuracy' in Law and the Development of 
Society, ed. J. Faubion (2003) 5, 6 and 8. 
4 K. Li and F. Zhang, 'The Research on the Mechanism of Procuracy' in Research on the Work Mechanism of Procuracy and 
Practical Issues, eds. P. Mu and Z. Zhen (2008) 9. 
5 J. Fionda, Public prosecutors and discretion: A Comparative Study (1995) 6. 
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relations between the procuracy, the police and the judiciary by drawing on empirical data from 
daily prosecutorial practices. The fieldwork was carried out by myself over a period of six 
months (including four and half months in 2012 and then a six weeks' follow-up revisit at the 
same site in 2013) in China. The data was collected through participant observations and semi-
structured interviews. Given that the Chinese authority treats every piece of information 
regarding criminal justice as sensitive, negotiating access to the field sites was difficult. As a 
result, the participant observations were confined to one local procuracy (site A), which has 
over 630,000 residents in its jurisdiction. It is situated in an urban area of a big city, the 
population comprising a mixture of social classes:  approximately 70 percent being working 
class (including migrant workers from surrounding towns and cities, and neighbouring 
provinces), and having a growing middle class. The procuracy in site A was the busiest 
prosecution service in the area, dealing with around 2,000 cases each year. I was given 
unmediated access to the investigative dossiers pending trial and had the opportunity to observe 
prosecutorial interrogation, following prosecutors' work routines. I was able to speak to the 
police officers, who sent new cases and required legal opinions from the prosecutors, and to 
observe trials. Everything I observed in the field was captured in field notes that became a 
voluminous record detailing the environment, behaviours and conversations of the legal 
personnel involved. At the end of the observational period, 28 semi-structured interviews with 
different legal actors (7 police officers, 7 judges, 7 prosecutors and 7 defence lawyers) were 
conducted in ten geographic areas (site A to J). Prior to the interview, consent was sought from 
the interviewees, with the consent form being explained in detail and using plain language). 
All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. Throughout this study empirical data are 
assigned an identification code based upon the resource from which they were collected. In 
general, the data were drawn either from field notes recording the observation in site A, which 
are given the code initiated with APU, or from interviews over the ten different sites. Interview 
data can be recognised with the code as a combination of the letter identifying the field sites 
and the abbreviation of their legal roles. For example, prosecutors are abbreviated as PS, judges 
from district courts (or trial courts) are abbreviated as TJ and judges from intermediate courts 
(or appeal courts) are abbreviated as AJ. Thus, for example, interview excerpts BPS-1 were 
extracted from the interview with a prosecutor working in site B. I have also monitored 64 
cases from the time they were transferred to the procuracy to the final judgment. These cases 
can be identifiable through the code initiated CASEA. 
   This paper begins with an assessment of the historical background of the Chinese procuracy 
and the academic debate regarding the function of supervision. This questions the rationality 
of the supervisory role of prosecutors, especially the conflicting authorities between the 
procuracy and the judiciary. The second part, outlines the way the procuracy supervises police 
investigations and evaluates the efficacy of prosecutorial supervision. It moves on to analyse 
the strategic relationship between the procuracy and the courts, examining what the power of 
supervision actually means. The final part explores the ethos of prosecutors and how they 
perceive their role in the criminal justice system. 
THE SOVIET LEGACY AND THE INTRICACY OF THE SUPERVISORY POWER 
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The Soviet procuracy was the most authoritative institution in the Soviet legal system.6 It was 
entrusted to supervise the observance of laws by all ministries, government agencies, 
enterprises, social organisations, and individuals (general supervision), as well as the 
application of law in legal processes (special supervision). 7The Soviet procuracy has its roots 
in early 18th Century Russia, and was re-introduced by Lenin in 1922 as a centralised, 
hierarchal, legal institution 'to watch over the establishment in reality of a uniform conception 
of legality in the whole republic'. 8  Despite the distinctive approach of comprehensive 
supervision, the Soviet procuracy, with its unitary hierarchical structure, is reminiscent of the 
public prosecution service in Continental Europe, such as in France and Germany.9 Also, the 
Soviet procuracy claimed to be the guardian of socialist legality, which is comparable to the 
role of inquisitorial prosecutor in protecting individual liberties from the abuse of state power.10 
   The Soviet procuracy system was widely adopted by many former Socialist countries due to 
political allegiance.11 Transplanting the Soviet-style procuracy into the Chinese system was 
predominately a political choice. The fact that in 1949 the newly founded People's Republic of 
China was a Communist regime, isolated by Western countries, suggests that following the 
Soviet model was the only option available at the time.12 The Soviet Union's involvement in 
the early construction of China's legal system, through sending its legal experts, also played an 
important role in building a similar procuracy system.13 Like the process of many other legal 
transplants, copying the Soviet model was not an easy task, and it has not been transplanted 
into China in its entirety. Thus, in practice, the Soviet procuracy's general supervisory function 
has not been adopted, leaving the function of the Chinese procuracy limited to supervising the 
enforcement of legal institutions. Also, the procuracy has been structured to a dual leadership, 
subordinated to the local People's Congress at a corresponding level and the procuracy at a 
higher level, rather than the 'vertical leadership' of the Soviet model. 14This adaptation is largely 
due to the lack of funding in the central procuracy and a shortage of professional staff in many 
deprived regions.15 
                                                          
6 G. B. Smith, 'The Impact of Socialism on Soviet Legal Institutions and Procedures' (1984) 23 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 315, 
at 320-322. 
7 Id., p.76 -77. 
8 Smith, op. cit., n.6. 
9 See E Luna and M Wade, The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective (2012). 
10 T Weigend, 'A Judge by Another name? Comparative Perspectives on the Role of the Public Prosecutor' in The Prosecutor 
in Transnational Perspective, eds. E Luna and M Wade (2012) 382. See also J. Hodgson, French Criminal Justice: A 
Comparative Account of the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime in France (2005). 
11 H. Oda, 'The Procuracy and the Regular Courts as Enforcers of the Constitutional Rule of Law: The Experience of East 
Asian States' (1986) 61 Tulane Law Review. 1339. 
12 G. Xu, 'Historical Explanation and Rethink about the Procuracy as a Supervisory Institution' (2013) 10 Dongyue Tribune, 
142, at144. 
13 D. Han and W. Yu, 'The Constitutional Relationship between the Courts, the Procuracy and the Police (2011) 3 Legal 
Study. 3, at 10. 
14 Oda, op. cit., n. 11. S. C Leng, and H. Chiu, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Analysis and Documents (1985) 69. 
15 C. Xie and W. Ren, 'The Influence of the Soviet Procuracy on Our Legal System' (2010)7 Hebei Law Science 195, 197. X. 
Zhao and T. Liu, 'The Shaping and Development of the Procuracy of the People's Republic of China' (2006) 3 The Jurist 39, 
44. Q. Sun, 'The Glory Journey of the People's Procuracy: In Memory of the Recovery of the People's Procuracy for 30 
years' (2008) 11 People's Procuracy. 5, at 8. 
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   The early development of the procuracy was fraught with difficulties. Socialist legality, 
which was highly regarded in the Soviet Union, was treated with suspicion by the Chinese 
Party leaders.16 As China's relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated in the late 1950s, 
the Soviet bureaucratic model was replaced by Maoist mass mobilisation and 'politics in 
command'.17 During the Anti-Rightist Movement between 1957 and 1965, the procuracy's 
supervisory function was criticised for 'weakening and denying the dictatorship of the 
proletariat'.18 Prosecutors were purged as 'right deviationists and revisionists' and attacked for 
making a 'fetishism of law'.19 The procuracy ceased to function in the late 1950s and the Party 
Committees completely controlled the criminal process. During the Cultural Revolution, it 
continued to be targeted for being a hindrance to the 'proletarian revolution' and was eventually 
abolished in the early 1970s. 20 
   After the Cultural Revolution, the Constitution Law 1978 restored the legal status of the 
procuracy and its supervisory power to oversee the criminal justice institutions.21 It is tasked 
to detect and investigate corruption crimes,22 sanction arrests,23 prosecute criminality,24 and 
check the legality of trial proceedings and courts' decisions25at different stages of the criminal 
process. These roles are undertaken by different departments of the procuracy. The department 
of anti-corruption investigation, for example, is responsible for detecting crimes related to 
public servants in office. The department of prosecution has the duty to bring criminal charges 
to trial and to have oversight of the court by counter-appealing (kangsu) judgments containing 
errors to a higher court.  
   This model of supervision, in addition to various procedural commitments, embodies an 
extraordinary concentration of power. This is justified by the distinct socialist ideology, which 
is considered to be divergent from the doctrine of the separation of powers.26 Wang Guiwu 
explained that because other forms of prosecutorial power arrangements invariably belong to 
the capitalist discourse and thereby had to be abandoned completely, setting up the procuracy 
directed by Leninist legal thought was the historical destination. 27  The configuration of 
procuratorial power was believed to conform to the socialist polity of the People's democratic 
                                                          
16 H. Chiu, 'China's Criminal Justice System and the Trial of Pro-democracy Dissidents'(1992) New York University Journal 
of International Law and Politics, 1181. Leng and Chiu, op, cit., n.14, p.16. 
17 Leng and Chiu, op, cit., n.14, p.16. 
18 Oda, op. cit., n. 11, p.1344; Han and Yu, op, cit, n.13; Xie and Ren, op, cit, n.15, p. 197-198. Zhao and Liu, op. cit, n.15. 
Sun, op. cit, n.15. T. Hsia and W. I.  Zeldin, 'Recent Legal Developments in the People's Republic of China' (1987) 28 Harv. 
Int'l. L. J. 249. 
19 Hsia and Zeldin,id., p.21. 
20 Leng and Chiu, op, cit., n.14, p.17-18. Han and Yu, op, cit., n.13. Min Shan, 'The historical change and rethink about the 
power of the procuracy' (2010) 5 National Procuracy College Review. 52, at 62. 
21 The Constitutional Law 1978, Art 43; the procuracy's legal standing has been preserved in the following Constitutional 
law. See Art 129 of The Constitutional Law 1982 (last amended in 2004). 
22 Criminal Procedure Law 2012, Art 18. 
23 Criminal Procedure Law 2012, Art 78. 
24 Criminal Procedure Law 2012, Art 167. 
25 Criminal Procedure Law 2012, Art 203 and 217. 
26 See C. Xie, 'The Nature of the Power of Procuracy' (2000) 2 Legal Study of China 34. 
27 G. Wang, A Study of the Procuracy in the People's Republic of China (1991) 164. 
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dictatorship, which should be organised through the principle of democratic centralism (minzhu 
jizhongzhi) rather than 'the hypercritic capitalist parliamentary system'. 28  This democratic 
centralism, which adopts the organisational principle of the combination of legislature and 
administration, suggests that communist institutions exercising sovereign power are entrusted 
with the protection of the general public; therefore the operation of the state should be 
prioritised as a matter of expediency, rather than as a question of principle.29 In this regard, the 
procuracy is mainly concerned with enforcement of the rule of the political regime,30 which is 
not necessarily equivalent to safeguarding the rights of individuals.  
   As the procuracy is simultaneously committed to several basic tasks in the criminal process, 
the extent to which this respects a blurring of roles is a point of tension. When Western 
jurisprudence was introduced into China in the 1990s, scholarly criticism was levelled at the 
nature of the power of the procuracy, and its triple identity of investigator, prosecutor and 
supervisor.31 Chinese academics, such as Chen Ruihua (1999) argued that the procuracy's role 
as a crime investigator and prosecutor inevitably undermined its status as an independent 
supervisor, since it was driven by the ambition of winning cases in the courts.32 Even though 
the procuracy is defined as an official body of supervision by the constitutional law,33 this 
primary function is often influenced by its secondary, but dominating, role of a partisan 
advocate. 
   Concerns are also generated by the procuracy's role in court. In light of the prosecutors' 
supervision, issues regarding the ceremonial ritual of the courts, such as 'should the prosecutor 
stand up when judges enter the court', have invoked widespread discussion that begs the 
question of 'who is actually in charge at trial?'34Some scholars have argued that the supervision 
of the courts has sabotaged the authority of the court, establishing the prosecutor as 'the judge 
over judges' and causing uncertainty in adjudication.35 As the debate has progressed, it has 
probed the nature of the power of supervision, begging the critical question as to who should 
supervise the supervisor: a paradox which seems to have no resolution under the current system. 
These considerations have given rise to a more general observation: the power of supervision 
has created an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict with the criminal prosecution principle, 
                                                          
28 Z. Mao, The Selection of Mao Zedong's Works, vol.4 (1991) 1480. 
29 D. Loeber, 'The Soviet Procuracy and the Rights of the Individual against the State' (1958) 1 J. Int'l Comm. Jur. 59, at 60. 
30 Oda, op. cit., n. 11. 
31 There is a substantial body of Chinese literature discussing the nature of the power of the procuracy. See e.g. Y. Wan, 
'Basic Study on the Power of Procuracy' (2008) 26 Political Science and Law Forum 91; Z. Long, 'The Nature of the Power 
of the Procuracy and the Legal Reform' (1999) 10 Legal Studies 2, 6. X. Hu, 'Rethink and Reconstruct the Power of the 
Procuracy in China' (2001) 10 Legal Research and Exploration 43; W. Chen, 'Rethink and Reconstruct the Power of the 
Procuracy in China: Based on the Prosecution Power' (2002) 2 Legal Studies 3; Y. Hao, 'Questioning the Power of the 
Procuracy' (1999) 3 China Renmin University Review 71. 
32 H. Dong, 'Thoughts about the Multiple Functions of the Judicial Institutions in China' (1997) 4 China Legal Studies 27. 
Chen Ruihua, The Fronting Edge of Chinese Criminal Justice (1999) 530. 
33 Pursuant to Art.129 of the Constitutional Law, the People's procuracy is the institution responsible for legal supervision. 
34 Z. Long, 'Should the Prosecutor Stand Up? Some Thoughts about the Court Rituals' (1997) 3 Legal Studies 44, 45; W. He, 
'The Surprising Question of Whether the Prosecutor Should Stand Up: A Discussion with Mr Long Zongzhi' (1997) 2 Legal 
Studies 58. 
35 Chen, op. cit., n. 31. 
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both in theory and in practice.  Apparently, this tension is derived from the Soviet legacy. As 
Chen Ruihua (1999) put it: 
It is a Utopian-like myth that a State institution with the responsibility to prosecute and detect crimes is 
given the mission to supervise and guarantee the uniformity of the enforcement of law, and to rectify the 
wrongs that are made by other legal institutions.36 
   Facing this theoretical dilemma, effort has been directed towards reframing the power of 
supervision, and academic views have differed on the actual nature of the power of the 
procuracy. Hitherto, four categorizations have been advanced to define the nature of the 
procuracy: 
   (i) an executive power. This school of academics believes that the power of the procuracy 
should belong to the executive. Compared to judicial power, this proposition argues that the 
procuracy lacks an independent status; its decision is not legally binding, nor does it have the 
effect of a final resolution.37 
   (ii) a judicial power. Directly opposed to the aforementioned position, this viewpoint believes 
that prosecutors serve as guardians of the criminal justice system; their prosecutorial decisions 
are based upon evidence and facts, the function of which should place it alongside the 
judiciary.38 
   (iii) double ascriptions. This view argues that the power of procuracy embodies the 
characteristics of both the executive and the judiciary: the vertical leadership of the procuracy 
makes it closer to the executive and its activities concerning prosecution resemble the judicial 
power.39  
   (iv) a supervisory power. This proposition affirms that the power of the procuracy should 
preserve its Soviet heritage and operate as a supervisory body. It argues that the function of 
supervision should be perceived as a unique form of state power, despite it presenting certain 
features similar to the executive and the judiciary.40 As Zhang Zhihui argued:  
The fundamental reason why the constitutional law juxtaposes the procuracy's power of supervision with the 
power of government and the power of adjudication is not because it wants the procuracy to share the power 
of the executive with the government, nor does it want the procuracy to share the power of the judiciary. The 
constitutional law does so purely because it wants the procuracy to supervise the government and the 
judiciary.41 
                                                          
36 Chen, op. cit., n. 32, p.531. 
37 Chen, op. cit., n. 31.; Hao, op. cit., n. 31. 
38 Long, op. cit., n. 31. 
39 Y. Wan, 'Some basic theoretical issues on the power of the prosecution: Returning to the starting point of the doctrine of 
the procuracy' (2008) 3 Tribunal of Political Science and Law 91, 92.   
40 See S. Tan, The Research of the Chinese Judicial Reform (2000); C. Xie, 'The Nature of the Procuracy' (2000) 2 Legal 
Studies 34; Z. Zhang, A Study of the Power of the Procuracy (2007) p. 34.   
41 Z. Zhang, 'The Power of Procuracy and its Supervisory Nature' (2004) 3 The Procuracy of Shanxi 76, 76. 
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   While these proposals might be useful in exploring the controversial function of the procuracy, 
some crucial issues, such as the independence of the procuracy, have been side-lined in the 
debate. UN Guidelines for Prosecutors (UN Guidelines) and The Standards of Professional 
Responsibility and Statement of the Essential Duties and Rights of Prosecutors (The Standards) 
require that prosecutors perform their duties without prejudice, favour or intimidation. 42 
Regarding this standard, how to adjust prosecutors' affiliation to different branches of the state, 
so that prosecutors can maintain neutrality, has often been a focal point in Western academic 
discussion. For example, criticism has been levelled at the affinity between prosecutors and 
judges in Italy after the Constitutional law severed the link between the prosecution and 
political bodies and attached the power of the prosecution to the judiciary. 43  In France, 
academic attention has been given to a conflict between the independence of procureurs and 
the requirement that prosecutors be democratically accountable to the Minister of Justice, 
thereby being susceptible to interference in sensitive cases. 44  In England and Wales, 
prosecutors' impartiality is projected in articulation between the long established police force 
and the relatively new creation of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Even though the CPS 
has a sphere of responsibility, which is independent, it has been criticised for a lack of 
objectivity due to its subordination to the police. 45 
   In China the procuracy's independence from executive bodies, organisations or individuals, 
is explicitly stated in the Constitutional Law.46 Yet the procuracy's 'dual subordination' has 
placed the procuracy in a vulnerable position to deal with various political bodies whilst 
maintaining its independence. For instance, the procuracy's subordination to the local congress 
is reflected in the reality that the local council controls the personnel and the operational budget 
of the procuracy. 47Local influences are able to interfere with prosecutors' actions in individual 
cases via higher ranked officials within the procuracy.48 Meanwhile the procuracy's political 
accountability to the Communist Party also allows certain Party institutions to intervene in 
prosecutors' decision-making. Thus the Political-legal Committee, a Party institution 
responsible for coordinating the relationship between different legal institutions, has, 
historically, created a tension between the independence of the procuracy and the requirement 
that the procuracy follow the Party's leadership.49 This has been demonstrated most clearly in 
the exercise of the Political-legal Committee's power to issue directions to prosecutors in 
influential cases that resulted in miscarriages of justice. After a negative social response, in 
                                                          
42 UN Guidelines, 4 and 13; The Standards, 3. 
43 M Caianiello, 'The Italian Public Prosecutor: An Inquisitorial Figure in Adversarial Proceedings?' in The Prosecutor in 
Transnational Perspective, eds, E Luna and M Wade (2012) p. 255. 
44 J. Hodgson, 'Hierarchy, Bureaucracy, and Ideology in French Criminal Justice: Some Empirical Observations' (2002) 29 
Journal of Law and Society 236. See also Hodgson, op. cit., n.10. 
45 See B. Hancock and J. Jackson, Standards for prosecutors: An Analysis of the United Kingdom National Prosecuting 
Agencies (2006) ch 4. F.  Belloni and J. Hodgson, Criminal Injustice: An Evaluation of the Criminal Justice Process in 
Britain (2000) ch 6. A. Sanders et al., Criminal Justice (2010) ch7. 
46 The Constitutional Law, Art. 131. 
47 Y. Du and J. Zhang, 'Research on the Personnel Management of the Procuracy', the 13th Annual Conference Paper of 
Shanghai Social Science 2015. C. Yuang, 'The Financial Safeguards of the Procuracy' (2014) 4 Legal System and Society 
229. 
48 See Y Mou, 'Beyond Legitimate Grounds: External Influences and the Discretionary Power not to Prosecute in the 
People's Republic of China' in Discretionary Criminal Justice in a Comparative Context, eds. M. Caianiello and J. Hodgson 
(2015)121. 
49 Id. 
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recent years the Political-legal Committee has gradually suspended its power to issue 
instructions in individual cases, but in practice Party institutions still have an overriding 
authority over the procuracy, and influence the procuracy in a less formal way.50 
 
SUPERVISING THE POLICE INVESTIGATION 
If a role of supervision accords with the logic of the criminal procedure, it would be best 
demonstrated in its oversight of the police. Supervision over the legality of the police 
investigation has been perceived as an essential part of the function of the prosecution in many 
countries and is endorsed by the International Association of Prosecutors. For example, The 
Standards require prosecutors to 'ensure that the investigation services respect legal precepts 
and fundamental human rights' when supervising the police investigation. 51  Prosecutors' 
control of police over investigation is a common feature in countries with the inquisitorial 
tradition. Prosecutors in adversarial systems do not have any substantive involvement in the 
phase of investigation. 52Nevertheless, in some jurisdictions such as England and Wales, the 
police may seek appropriate advice from prosecutors to facilitate the effectiveness of an 
investigation and prosecution.53  
   In countries with an inquisitorial influence, the level of prosecutors' involvement in the police 
investigation varies, depending on the specific police-prosecutor relationship mandated by law. 
Thus, Dutch prosecutors are responsible for 'all aspects of criminal investigation', ensuring the 
police comply with law.54 Likewise in France, the procureur oversees the majority of the police 
investigation, including questioning suspects held in police custody (garde à vue).55 Although 
the effectiveness of this supervisory model over the conduct of investigations has been 
criticised, it is designed to provide a safeguard to suspects, preventing intrusive infringements 
of an individual's liberty.56 The Italian prosecutor's involvement with police investigation is 
less prominent compared to other inquisitorial countries; yet they can still exercise authority 
over certain units among the police corps.57 Japanese prosecutors perhaps possess the highest 
level of control over investigation, and routinely 'interact with the police during the pre-charge 
                                                          
50 Id. See also 'Self-reform of the Central Political-Legal Committee: No Interference with Individual Cases' (News.ifeng 
14/07/2013) < http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2013_07/14/27479910_0.shtml > accessed at 3/11/2014. 
51 The Standards, 4.2 (b). See also 'The Role of Public Prosecution in the Criminal Justice System' in Council of Europe 
Recommendation (2000) 19, 22(a). 
52 Hancock and Jackson, op. cit., n. 45. Belloni and Hodgson, op. cit., n. 45, ch 2-4. D. Harris, 'The Interaction and 
Relationship Between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the United States, and How this Affects Police Reform' in The 
Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective, eds. E Luna and M Wade (2012) p. 56. 
53 CPS, 'Prosecution Policy and Guidance' < http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/a_to_c/cps_relations_with_the_police/>. 
54 Although in practice, the police are in charge of most investigation due to the limited prosecution resource. See P. J. P. 
Tak, 'The Dutch Prosecutor: A Prosecuting and Sentencing Officer' in The Prosecutor in Transnational Perspective, eds. E 
Luna and M Wade (2012) p.141. 
55 See also Hodgson, op. cit., n.10. p.144. 
56 Id., p. 146. 
57 Caianiello, op. cit., n. 43., p.252. 
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investigation', rather than simply relying on the police for information.58 Their proactive stance 
illustrates that prosecutors are the dominant partners in the police-prosecutor relationship.  
   Comparative empirical research suggests that the effectiveness of the public prosecutors' 
authority to direct the investigation should not be overstated. Mathias' (2002) study of 
prosecutorial supervision in Germany, Belgium and France reveals that prosecutors can do little 
about the investigation, because the police seldom inform them until the inquiry is almost 
over.59 Chinese prosecutorial supervision, similar to this practice, is also passive and has an 
'after-event' model. Most police investigations are carried out solely by the police.60 Only when 
the police have completed their investigation and have transferred the case to the procuracy 
can prosecutors intervene, and issue further directions and guidance to the police if evidence 
requires, thereby prolonging the investigative phase.61 This procedural arrangement cuts short 
the prosecutorial supervision, leaving the main police investigation free from any sort of direct 
external scrutiny. 62  Rather than monitoring how the investigation is conducted, the 
prosecutorial oversight focuses upon the end product of the police work, mostly through 
examining the investigative dossier and interrogating suspects. Prosecutors are also allowed to 
gather evidence, such as interviewing the victim and witnesses, to evaluate the case 
independently, but this is restricted to limited categories of circumstances.63 
   Hodgson's (2005) research indicates that the French prosecutor's oversight is merely a paper 
exercise, as the procureur is mostly concerned with the result of the investigation. Since the 
procureur aligns herself with the police, the police are given a free hand in constructing the 
case against suspects.64 The oversight of the police in China is very similar to their French 
counterparts in that their primary concern is not about the actual process, but rather about the 
end product of investigations, that is whether the basic written evidence is completed and 
whether the formalities of the evidence comply with legal requirements. However, the Chinese 
prosecutor goes further to assist the police in various ways to achieve this outcome.  
   Reviewing the investigative dossier is regarded as fundamental to the prosecution’s work. In 
China, witnesses are rarely called to testify at trial;65 as a result, the investigative dossier 
containing written evidence de facto determines the ultimate issue of the guilt or innocence of 
                                                          
58 Johnson, op. cit., n.1., p.51-55. 
59 E. Mathias, 'The Balance of Power between the Police and the Public Prosecutor', in European Criminal Procedures eds. 
D Mireille and J Spencer (2002) 459-487. 
60 W. Chen and Y. Hao, 'A Study of the Integration of the Investigation and the Prosecution: On the Necessity of Reforming 
the Criminal Justice System in China' (1999) 1 China Legal Studies 58, at 64. 
61 According to CPL 2012, Art. 171, the procuracy can require a maximum of two further investigation conducted by the 
police to gather further evidence. 
62 Although the police must request the authorisation from the procuracy in order to remand suspects in custody, the 
procuracy does not monitor other police work. 
63 This is often subject to local practices. For example, at site A, prosecutors only interview the victims in rape and assault 
cases. 
64 Hodgson, op. cit., n.10. 
65 It is generally believed that in less than 5 per cent of the cases, witnesses appear at court to provide testimony in China. 
The reasons for the absence of witnesses (including both witnesses for the prosecution and for the defence) at trial is 
multifaceted, which is beyond the analysis of this article.  
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the accused in the vast majority of instances. For example, the prosecutors at site A spent much 
time chasing a missing notification of the victim's rights from the police, 66  correcting a 
statement in which the critical date fell outside of the legal period,67 or providing consultancy 
as to how to fix a suspicious interrogation record that was not signed by the accused.68 As long 
as the written evidence appears lawful in format and conforms to legal requirements, the police 
case is approved by prosecutors, disregarding the methods of construction. In a drug trafficking 
case (CASE A 47), the prosecutor discovered that a record of the quantity of the drug had not 
been made. This procedural mistake seemed impossible to rectify due to the lapse of time. 
Nevertheless, a record of the quantity of the drug with a perfectly matched date and the 
suspect's signature was subsequently sought and obtained by the procuracy.  
   The tactics employed by the police to resolve all sorts of procedural mistakes were familiar 
to the prosecutors, who rarely demonstrated any desire to investigate the legality of the process 
of evidence collection. The authenticity of the legal documents was never questioned by 
prosecutors. Prosecutors constantly gave constructive legal advice to enhance the probative 
value of the written evidence, and to make a procedurally flawed case appear persuasive. When 
an unlawful issue was identified by the prosecutors, they assisted the police in legitimising the 
tainted evidence. On one occasion, a senior prosecutor addressed two police officers who 
distorted the details of the witness' testimony, resulting in all of the written statements in the 
dossier being suspiciously identical: 
I have to warn you that if you keep making all the details of different accounts exactly the same, the 
truthfulness of these statements will be doubted. In many circumstances, witnesses cannot remember the 
exact time. […] So if you just keep the details roughly the same and leave some reasonable discrepancies, 
the evidence is more convincing. If you try to match everything in the dossier, the effect may be contrary. 
(Field note APU-55) 
 
   In reviewing the police work, the objective of the prosecutor is to offer professional guidance, 
so that the construction of a legally coherent dossier can withstand the scrutiny of the court. 
Nevertheless the prosecutor's supervisory power should not be overemphasised in terms of the 
way in which prosecutors can influence the police investigation. Prosecutors can give 
instructions to the police regarding evidence gathering to fulfil the prosecution’s criteria, after 
they have reviewed the case dossier. However, the police did not always respond to the 
prosecutor's instructions.69 Despite prosecutors' heavy workloads, occasionally they had to 
undertake evidence gathering themselves, partly because 'the quality of the police case was not 
up to scratch', and partly because the police ignored their advice.70 
                                                          
66 Field note APU19. 
67 Field note APU18. 
68 Field note APU19. 
69 Field notes APU-37, 38 and 41. See also M. McConville et al., Criminal Justice in China: An Empirical Inquiry (2011) 
385. 
70 Field notes APU-41, 42, 60 and 62. 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Wiley in Journal of Law 
and Society Vol. 44 (4): http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-6478/issues  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24755/  
 
 
13 
 
   Pursuant to Article 168 and 170 of Criminal Procedural Law 2012 (CPL 2012), prosecutors 
have the duty to interrogate suspects in order to verify the veracity of the accounts and to 
supervise the investigation process. Yet in practice, prosecutorial interrogation is largely 
routinised, and hardly shows any zeal for exploring potential anomalies in the police-dominated 
investigation. It was often carried out in a way that validated the statements contained in the 
investigative dossier. Questions were deliberately formulated to lead suspects to confess and to 
dovetail with the police case. The interrogating questions, such as 'how did you conduct the 
theft?', rather than 'did you conduct the theft?', implied that the crime in question had been 
acknowledged.71 Likewise, the suspect was asked how much profit she had received from the 
transaction, rather than asking whether the illegal transaction generated any profit.72 Suspects 
were dissuaded from giving a story that was inconsistent with the case dossier. Most of the 
prosecutors' records of interrogation were pre-typed by copying suspects' previous statements 
in the investigative dossier as a general practice. When suspects pleaded guilty, the 'ready-to-
sign' interrogation record was produced to complete the process.  
   Confessions are the primary source of evidence in China, upon which the police construct 
their case and the prosecution relies for disposal at court.73 Hence when confessions were 
retracted or disputed during prosecutorial interrogation, suspects were subject to a range of 
coercive tactics, from tough lectures, oppressive abuse, such as being shouted at, or the 
prosecutor slamming furniture,74 to psychological threats, such as threatening to prosecute 
suspects' close family or deliberately delaying the case, 75  depending on how suspects 
responded. In one case, a suspect refused to confess, and the prosecutor decided to educate him: 
Let me tell you, the crime you committed does not carry a heavy penalty. If you confess, you can get out of 
the prison very quickly, possibly before the Spring Festival. It will make our work much easier. […] This is 
purely for your own benefit. You can look after your child if you get out [of the prison] earlier. Think about 
your child, your wife and your parents. Be responsible! (Field note APU- 62) 
   On this occasion, the prosecutor's advice was not appreciated. The suspect insisted that the 
whole process was set up by the police, the drug was planted and he was innocent. Not 
believing his story, the frustrated prosecutor's tension escalated. He thumped the desk and 
shouted at the suspect: 
You deserve to be locked up for a very long time. Let's see who is right. You deserve it. I can make your stay 
in the prison as long as possible! 76(Field note APU- 62) 
   The prosecutorial interrogation provides an opportunity for the prosecutor to oversee the 
legality of the investigation, ensuring the proper treatment of suspects, but in reality this 
                                                          
71 Field note APU-34. 
72 Field note APU-12. 
73 See McConville et al., op. cit., n.69, Ch.4. 
74 Field note APU-12, 13 and 62. 
75 Field note APU-34, 37, 38 and 62. 
76 The prosecutor did honour his words in this instance. He recommended a sentence at the top of the tariff which was 
adopted by the court. Field note APU- 62. 
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function is largely overlooked. Illegally obtained evidence and malpractice reported by 
suspects are routinely disregarded and are rarely investigated by prosecutors. The alleged 
maltreatment of suspects during the prosecutorial interrogation was simply disregarded when 
the issue of torture and the use of other illicit methods were brought up by suspects. Where a 
suspect made such assertions, the reaction of the prosecutor was either outright scepticism or 
to ignore it. In CASE A 34, when the suspect complained, 'I was hung up and beaten by the 
police', it was greeted with indifference by the prosecutor; and when suspects reported police 
cruelty towards other witnesses in CASE A 42,  'the police poured hot chilli-pepper water into 
the nostrils of the prostitutes', the response was an accusation that the suspect was lying. 
Although a substantial number of cases involved such allegations,77 in only one case was the 
claim of torture taken seriously, and one confession was excluded by prosecutors at site A. The 
exclusion of one statement did not make much difference to that case, as suspects were 
invariably forced to make multiple confessions (usually between three and eleven). In other 
cases, no further action was initiated.  
OVERSEEING THE COURTS 
The relationship between prosecutors and judges varies from country to country, subject to its 
legal tradition. Prosecutors working in a hierarchical model usually maintain a superior position, 
on a par with the adjudicator.78 This exalted position is derived from the complex role of 
adjudication, which has a far-reaching consequence of judicial independence. In France the 
judicial function has historically encompassed a prosecutorial and investigative role, as well as 
one of adjudication. The office of public prosecutor, created out of the multiple roles of the 
judge, is inherently close to that of judges. The two legal actors belong to the broadly defined 
magistrature, and partake in investigative and judicial functions.79 Their status as magistrates 
means that they have received a common training background and can move between the two 
roles seamlessly.80 In Germany and the Netherlands, influenced by the French system, judges 
and prosecutors are also trained together and are able to switch between the two roles. They 
also have an overlapping history that develops a natural bond.81 The similar ties of collegiality 
and exchangeable career paths of the two roles have also extended to Japan.82 However, this 
close relationship between the two legal actors stems from a divergent historical origin, in 
which the prosecutor played a dominant role, 'controlling all budgetary and administrative 
matters of the judiciary',83 whereas the court was a 'semi-independent organ' in the Ministry of 
                                                          
77 Out of the 64 cases that I followed, 27 cases were alleged to have involved serious malpractice (from overbearing 
behaviours to torture) of the police.   
78 M.R. Damaska, The faces of justice and state authority (1986) 18-23. 
79 Prosecutors have a quasi-judicial role in the pre-trial stage and the trial judge adopts an interventionist stance, actively 
questioning the participants for information. This also includes juge d'instruction, the magistrate responsible for 
investigating serious cases through the procedure known as instruction. See Hodgson, op. cit., n.10., ch. 3. 
80 Id. 
81 Fionda, op. cit., n.5, p.159. Weigend, op. cit., n.10, p.382. 
82 Although Japan was influenced by the United States after World War II, it embodies features from inquisitorial traditions, 
especially Germany. Johnson, op. cit., n. 1., p. 65. 
83 Id, 61. 
This is the accepted version of a forthcoming article that will be published by Wiley in Journal of Law 
and Society Vol. 44 (4): http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-6478/issues  
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24755/  
 
 
15 
 
Justice run by prosecutors.84 This historical development has created a compliant judiciary that 
tends to be co-operative with the prosecution.85 
   Adversarial systems are founded on the rationale that the trial resembles a contest between 
two parties. The prosecutor, as a party, is distant from the arbiter of facts, who plays a passive 
and neutral role. In this aspect, the adversarial model readily complies with the international 
standards that require the prosecutorial role to be kept separate from the judicial role.86 Within 
adversarial systems, the prosecutorial power and judicial review are not equally matched. For 
example, the judicial review in the United States has been criticised as not being strong enough 
to check the prosecutor's power in affecting sentences in guilty plea cases. 87 This is often 
justified by the belief that prosecutors are entrusted by the local voters to act responsibly as 
neutral quasi-judicial officers, who are accorded the discretion to divert a case from the court.88 
In contrast, England and Wales have a stronger judicial review. Judges not only have sole 
responsibility for sentencing,89 but are also able to scrutinise the CPS's discretion regarding the 
prosecution of a certain case and whether it constitutes an abuse of process.90  
   In China, the prosecutor-judge relationship is less influenced by the historical development 
of the two institutions, but is determined by the political-legal context. The procuracy has the 
power to supervise the courts through counter-appealing an erroneous judgment pursuant to 
Article 217 of CPL 2012.91 When mistakes regarding the ascertaining of fact or application of 
law are identified,92 the prosecutor can initiate a re-trial by submitting the case to a higher level. 
Here the case in question will be reviewed and the prosecution supported at the higher court. 
If the suspected error is confirmed by the court, the responsible judges will be subject to 
disciplinary sanctions.  
   This power to counter-appeal, however, has been disputed by some academics, who have 
questioned whether the action of counter-appealing is a real power of supervision. For example, 
Li Guimao (1997) argues that since this prosecutorial action does not compel the court to 
conform to the proposition of the procuracy, and the ultimate decision rests in the hands of the 
judge, the power to counter-appeal should be better framed as a prosecutorial suggestion. 
                                                          
84 Id. 
85 Id, 62. 
86 UN Guidelines, 17. 
87 See Alissa P Worden, 'The Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Judges' agreement with prosecutors' sentencing 
recommendations (1995) 12 Just.Q. 257. Albert W Alschuler, 'The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining' (2015) 36 U. 
Chi.L.Rev. 50. Stephanos Bibas, 'Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial' (2003) 117 Harv.L.Rev. 2464. 
88 See Ronald Wright and Marc Miller, 'The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors' (2010) 67 Wash. & Lee L. 
Rev, 1587. Candace McCoy, 'Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea Bargaining Reform'(2005) 50 Crim. 
L.Q. 67. Gregory M Gilchrist, 'Plea Bargains, Convictions and Legitimacy' (2011) 48 Am. Crim. L.Rev. 143. 
89 However, prosecutors do have a significant input on sentencing through prosecution and charging decisions. See Barry 
Hancock and John Jackson, Standards for prosecutors: UK analysis: An analysis of the United Kingdom National 
Prosecuting Agencies (Wolf Legal Publishers 2008) 107. 
90 See e.g. R v Croydon Justices, ex Parte Dean [1993] 3 All ER 129. 
91 Loeber, op, cit., n.29. 
92 Normally, the counter-appeal should be initiated before the judgment becomes final. However, according to articles 242 
and 243, a re-trial can also be launched if an error in terms of the verdict or sentence is identified. 
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93Despite this academic dispute, prosecutors interviewed in this study have indicated that they 
are pleased with the power to check the work of the court, which gives them a sense of control 
of the outcome of cases.94 However this type of supervision is sparingly used in practice and 
oversight is not a central theme in the relationship. Prosecutors are more concerned with 
building mutual trust with judges than causing any friction.  
   Until 2015, the prosecutor's work performance was evaluated by the Appraisal System (jixiao 
kaohe zhidi) that connected the prosecutors' bonuses and promotion opportunities within their 
ranks to performance indicators, such as the conviction rate of prosecuted cases.95 It was a 
managerial framework devised to incentivise prosecutors to engineer the success of 
prosecutions; high conviction rates would bring benefits, whereas an acquittal would lead to a 
disadvantaged position. Although the abolition of the Appraisal System has officially been 
announced,96  it has a long-lasting impact on the practice of the prosecution. My recent follow 
up interviews with prosecutors illustrate that the conviction rates have continued to be used as 
a reference to measure the achievements of the leaders of the procuracy. According to these 
prosecutors, 'no essential change has been made' and avoiding acquittals remains their focus.97  
    The Appraisal System, together with a host of external factors (such as undue interference 
and media manipulated public opinion) has constituted a systematic body of 'hidden rules' 
(qianguizi), playing like the 'invisible hand' of the criminal justice system.98 These 'hidden 
rules' are the embodiment of cultural values that emphasise the importance of deference to 
authority and hierarchical structures. In many ways they function as conventions in directing 
the criminal justice system, thereby undermining the legitimacy of enacted laws. Fang Baoguo 
(2011) has noted that these rules are a reflection of the internal power struggles of criminal 
justice institutions. 99 The existence of such implicit rules indicates the limited efficacy of law 
in regulating the system. These implicit rules are routinely obeyed and constantly invoked to 
resolve the conflicts of interest that develop in practice. Over time, they have become working 
norms which regulate the behaviour of state officials. Non-compliance leads to consequences 
                                                          
93 See Li Guimao, 'The Reform of the Supervisory System of Chinese Legal System' (1997) 2 Chinese Social Science 122. 
94 Interview BPS-1, APS-4 and APS-3. 
95 Zhu Tonghui, 'The Appraisal System in the Criminal Justice System ' (2009) 1 Law and Social Science 5; Li Enshen, 'The 
Li Zhuang Case: Examining the Challenges Facing Criminal Defence Lawyer in China' (2010) 24 Columbia Journal of 
Asian Law 129, 164. 
96 On 20th January 2015, the Political and Judicial Commission under the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
mandated all the central and local criminal justice institutions to overhaul the performance indicators and to 'resolutely' 
cancel unreasonable appraisal items, including criminal detention rate, arrest rate, prosecution rate, conviction rate and case 
trial clear-up rate. 'Abolishing the four rates: Delightful Improvement in Human Rights Protection' (China News, 
22/01/2015) <http://www.chinanews.com/sh/2015/01-22/6995633.shtml>.   
97 Interviews APO-14, APS-18 and APO-15, conducted in December 2015 and April 2016. 
98 Liu Lei, 'Miscarriages of Justice made by the hidden rules' (2015) 15 Journal of Fujianjiangxia University 33, 35. See also 
Chen Ruihua, 'The hidden Rules in Chinese criminal justice' (2016)  Sina Webblog 
<http://www.chinalaw124.com/sifajujiao/20160514/15451.html>. Wang Haiyan, 'Reasonable explanation: Undermining the 
defence provisions and safeguards of alienation' (2012) 6 Tribune of Political Science and Law 25, 27. 
99 Fang Baoguo, The Hidden Rules of Criminal Evidence in China (2011) ch.1 
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for the relevant state official (including punishment) and affects the interests of the criminal 
justice institutions within which he or she works.100 
   Against this backdrop, prosecutors have strategically aligned themselves with their 
neighbouring court101 in the same institutional hierarchy. When a case was likely to be acquitted 
by the court, the court would inform the prosecutor proactively, and the prosecutor would 
withdraw the case immediately,102 or secretly replace the case with a different one prior to the 
court hearing.103 If the application of the law was controversially subjective, a discussion would 
be initiated by judges and negotiation would be conducted privately to reach a common 
understanding.104 In exchange, prosecutors would courteously give a hint to the court if errors 
were found in judgments, rather than launching a counter-appeal.105 In this mutually beneficial 
relationship, co-operation has replaced oversight. A relationship has been developed which 
enables their respective interests to be reconciled so as to avoid confrontation and loss of face. 
   Despite this alliance, the procuracy has never relinquished its power of supervision, and if 
needed, the counter-appeal remains a useful bargaining chip in securing the interests of the 
procuracy. This is exemplified by a 'crisis' caused by a potential acquittal witnessed by the 
author.106 During my fieldwork, the court intended to acquit a defendant due to an inappropriate 
charge of 'public provocation and picking quarrels (xingxun zishi zui)'.107 When the procuracy 
received the news, it was too late to withdraw the case; and to minimise the damage, they 
offered to trade the acquittal for two potential counter-appeals arising from mistakes found in 
two previous judgments.108 An agreement was eventually reached that the court would convict 
the defendant on the condition that the procuracy would drop the two counter-appeals.109 
   It is noted that such 'trade-off' negotiation is not conducive to their co-operative relationship, 
and is therefore not commonly seen in daily practice. Nevertheless, it reflects the interplay of 
the dynamic relations between the two institutions. As a senior prosecutor commented, the two 
institutions are not just bound in a bureaucratic alliance, but are involved in interrelationships 
that are in the nature of a game: 
I think we should call this ‘mutual games playing’. […] The two [the procuracy and the court] have some 
devices and mechanisms to control each other, yet they also have some mutual interests between 
themselves. The game playing has led to a very special type of relationship. (Interview APS-5) 
                                                          
100 Id. 
101 In China, many buildings of the procuracy and the court are adjacent, and prosecutors are given free access to the offices 
of judges. 
102 Withdrawing a case to avoid acquittal is a normal practice. See Huang Qiusheng, 'The Research on the Quality of the 
Cases Prosecuted by Taizhou Procuracy' (2007) 5 Zhejian Procuracy 87, 89. 
103 Field note APU-59. 
104 Field note APU-5. 
105 Field note APU-24. 
106 Field notes APU-6, 7, 8, 9 and 10. 
107 This is a type of public disorder offence. 
108 Field notes APU-6 and 7. 
109 Field notes APU-9 and 10. 
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   The two institutions constantly think about each other’s actions and rationalise their own 
functioning to preserve their interests, either in the form of privileges awarded for achievement 
or the respect in which they are held by the other.  
   China has a very high conviction rate, with acquittals being seen as anomalies in the criminal 
justice system.110 When a rare acquittal occurs, the case will be subject to strict scrutiny by the 
procuracy. In extreme instances, the procuracy would initiate an investigation against 
responsible judges, searching for potential corruption or judicial misconduct. 111  The 
procuracy's power of supervision is not only embodied in counter-appealing erroneous 
judgments, but by the proactive power to investigate crimes committed by government officials, 
including judges. Some prosecutors have suggested that judges' fear of the investigative power 
contributes to their harmonious relationship.112  
   It has been acknowledged that the capacity to initiate a counter-appeal and to investigate 
corruption and misconduct has been 'an important weapon in the power struggle' within the 
criminal justice system.113 This may explain the reason why the courts show extraordinary 
tolerance of prosecutors' sometimes inappropriate behaviour at trial. During my fieldwork, 
prosecutors were observed to make speeches of denunciation that were so emotionally charged, 
they could be classified as oppressive.114 Foul language used by the prosecutor to address the 
defendant was so inappropriate that it fell below professional standards, and when the defence 
protested, the judge remained silent. 115  The court's acquiescence in such prosecutorial 
behaviour occasionally led to poorly controlled proceedings. Thus, in one instance two defence 
lawyers were told by a prosecutor to 'shut up' when it was their turn to proffer an argument.116 
The prosecutor's usurpation of the judge's role clearly suggested who was really in charge of 
the trial.  
   The prosecutors' aggressive behaviour at trial, on the one hand, demonstrated the reality that 
they and the court were de facto on the same side, and furthermore, it demonstrated 'a degree 
of equivalence' between these two.117 As far as many judges are concerned, prosecutors have 
never been treated as ordinary parties in the courtroom: they are an authority. A senior judge 
illustrated this through an example:  
There are many things that have happened in China that you can never imagine occurring in other countries. 
Many years ago, when I was still a court clerk, one day in the trial, a prosecutor found that after the cross-
examination and evidence were adduced, the result of the case was adverse to him. So he stood up, took 
                                                          
110 According to the available official statistics of China, the conviction rates in recent years are: 99.86 per cent (the year of 
2008), 99.98 per cent (the year of 2009), 99.9 per cent (the year of 2010). See Law Yearbook of China (2009) 166; Law 
Yearbook of China (2010) 159; Law Yearbook of China (2011) 202. 
111 See, for example, Xu Yu, 'A Criminal Judge Committed Perjury and Was Convicted' (2000) 
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/11/20000517/66927.html> accessed on 23/04/2016. 
112 Field note APU 62. 
113 Id. 
114 Field note APU-43, 44, 46 and 47. 
115 Field note APU-61. 
116 Field notes APU-12 and APU-64. 
117 This has also been discussed in Mike McConville et al.'s study. See McConville et al., op. cit., n.69, p.388. 
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all the dossiers and stormed away from the court. […] Then, the court had to adjourn the trial and 
communicate with the prosecutor afterwards. In the end, the case was settled, but the prosecutor's behaviour 
was really surprising. […] In our country, the prosecutors are really powerful. (Interview GAJ-1) 
   These instances may not represent all prosecutors in China; yet these examples raise concerns 
regarding the professional standards of the prosecutor, and how the supervisory power has been 
exercised. Since the question of 'who should supervise the supervisor' remains unanswered in 
the Chinese context, it is crucial to understand who the prosecutors are, and how they 
understand their own role.  
 
THE ETHOS OF CHINESE PROSECUTORS 
International norms require that prosecutors must be individuals of integrity and ability, with 
appropriate education and training, and must be selected according to objective factors on a 
non-discriminatory basis according to fair and impartial procedures.118 In civil law jurisdictions, 
such as Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, the recruitment of career 
prosecutors is bureaucratic and is conducted in a similar way to that of judges. The prosecutors-
to-be have to pass judicial examinations and undergo a period of practical training before being 
assigned to take on the prosecutorial function.119 Prosecutors, as quasi-judicial figures, are 
expected to observe ethical standards in relation to impartiality, integrity and diligence.120 
Common law countries do not have a separate profession of prosecutor, rather they are drawn 
from ranks of practising lawyers. Thus, the CPS in England and Wales recruits from qualified 
solicitors and barristers, and runs its own legal trainee scheme.121 Qualified Crown Prosecutors 
are required to follow ethical standards specified in the Code for Crown Prosecutors and the 
Civil Service Code, as well as the standards set out by the Bar and The Law Society.122 
   Entrance to the career of prosecutor in China follows an approach similar to that in 
Continental European countries. Candidates intending to join the professions of lawyers, 
judges and prosecutors are required to hold a graduate degree and pass the National Justice 
Examination introduced in 2001. 123  Prospective prosecutors must also take civil servant 
examinations according to the post and may have to satisfy further preconditions, such as a 
postgraduate degree, before they are appointed. The recruitment of prosecutors is identical to 
                                                          
118 UN Guidelines, 1, 2 (a) and (b). 
119 See G. D. Federico, Recruitment, Professional Evaluation and Career of Judges and Prosecutors in Europe: Austria, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain (2005). 
120 Id, 65-66. 
121 Hancock and Jackson, op. cit., n. 45, p.89. 
122 Id, 91-92. 
123 X. Sun, 'The Dilemma of the Legal Education and How to Break Through: An Report on the Connection of Legal 
Education and The National Justice Examination System' (2012) 9 Legal Study 108-116. M. Qian, 'Problems on the 7-year 
Implementation of the National Justice Examination' (2009) 4 Research of Rule of Law 98. X. Zhang and L. Xu, 'Research 
on the National Justice Examination' (2011) Justice of China 77-78. 
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that of the judiciary, although it is generally believed that holding a post in the courts is more 
attractive than being a prosecutor at the same level.124 
   The educational background and competitive examinations create an almost familial bond 
between the two branches of the legal profession.125 Judges and prosecutors at the same level 
often develop a good working relationship, or even friendship.126 A few prosecutors expressed 
their wish to become judges, and entitled to a better salary and bonuses.127 Aside from the 
income, their dissatisfaction was particularly geared towards the heavy caseloads and deadline 
pressures with which they have to cope. It has become a repeated pattern that a few years after 
new recruits have settled into the job of prosecution, waning enthusiasm and a limited salary 
prompts many to seek less stressful positions. The leader of the procuracy at Site A explained: 
We put the most vigorous and talented young staff in the position of prosecution. However, the problem is 
that the turnover of the prosecutors is very fast. Once those able and talented young prosecutors have shown 
their ability, they tend to leave for other departments. Therefore, we are an unsettled army. (Field note APU-
2) 
   Prosecutors can become disillusioned, cynical or even depressed over time, suffering from 
'burnout', as many American public defenders with similar work conditions have 
experienced.128 Those who have remained in prosecution for a long time have found excuses 
to justify the slippage in the quality of cases and their mindless work style. This dissatisfaction 
is demonstrated in complaints lamenting their low payment.  
You can understand why we don't have the passion for our work now. For a whole month, we have to process 
about 15 cases, but we are paid so little. Defence lawyers charge 10,000 yuan for one case, and we are paid 
3,000 yuan for an average of 15 cases each month. How can we guarantee the quality? If we are paid as much 
as the defence lawyers, I will work so hard on each case. (Field note APU-47) 
   Resentment against the 'drudgery' of work has been a constant theme in office conversations. 
Prosecutors often dismissed themselves as 'working machines' and 'paperwork slaves'.129 This 
is contrasted with the authoritative image projected by legal rhetoric. The disparity of salary 
between prosecutors and judges seems to contradict the claimed superior position. Over time, 
the inadequate financial recognition has led to low self-worth. McConville et al (2011) suggest 
that this loss of personal esteem is largely attributable to a lack of professionalism, which if 
present, could provide a sense of competence. 130  Indeed, professionalism was rarely 
emphasised or apparent in their daily practice. The procuracy at site A was regarded as 'a model 
unit (shifan danwei)', receiving good practice awards and demonstrating prosecution 
                                                          
124 Interviews ATJ-1, GAJ-1, 2. 
125 See McConville et al., op. cit., n.69., p.386-390. 
126 Field notes APU-23, 24, 36 and 45. 
127 Interviews BPS-1, APS-5 and 6. 
128 See C. J Ogletree, 'Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders' (1993) 6 Harvard Law 
Review 1239; B. S Otey, 'Buffering Burnout: Preparing the Online Generation for the Occupational Hazards of the Legal 
Profession' (2014) South California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 147; L Norton et al, 'Burnout and Compassion Fatigue: 
What Lawyers Need to Know' (2015) 84 UMKC.L Rev. 987. 
129 Field notes APU-2, 11 & 44, and interview BPS-1. 
130 McConville et al., op. cit., n.69., p.390. 
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techniques to neighbouring procuracies,131 yet there were few useful training programmes 
available for the prosecutors. The majority of courses offered to the prosecutors were focused 
on Party propaganda, rather than providing useful skills, or cultivating professional values. In 
one instance, a prosecutor commented that an organised mock trial competition in which he 
took part was helpful in advancing his legal arguments; but he soon added that better 'legal 
theories' cannot guarantee success in real life. 132 Some prosecutors commented that most 
training was 'totally a waste of time'.133 Few of them were willing to participate in further 
training or education due to a heavy caseload.  
   As a type of apprenticeship, the prosecutor's skills and experiences are largely derived from 
the direction and guidance of the experienced main prosecutor (zhusu jianchaguan) in the 
office.134 When a junior prosecutor is allocated, the main prosecutor is accountable for all of 
the cases processed by the inexperienced prosecutor. The main prosecutors are responsible for 
distributing cases to the prosecutors in their offices, giving directions, and checking the 
progress and relevant issues in the cases. The main prosecutors are influential figures in the 
procuracy and their performance and personal values largely shape their professional 
competence. Nonetheless, working experience does not always correlate with the level of 
professionalism. In fact, main prosecutors have been observed to be antagonistic and tactical 
in manipulating the system and in dealing with the accused. On one occasion, a suspect 
confessed to a prosecutor an undetected crime of theft, during a prosecutorial interrogation. 
The junior prosecutor had never encountered such a situation before, noted down the new crime 
and reported it to the main prosecutor. It was expected that the prosecutor would liaise with the 
police and supervise the investigation. However, the main prosecutor was angry that the junior 
prosecutor had increased their workload by recording the new crime: 
Why did you write it down? Don't you think we have enough cases to handle? If the victims or the police did 
not file the case, we do not bother to investigate. Now, since you have written it down, you have to send the 
case to the police. You are looking for your own troubles. (Field note APU-16) 
   Prosecutors are depicted in legal rhetoric as being able to impartially review the case, treating 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence equally.135 When asked how they perceived their role as 
prosecutors, a few of them responded to me that 'they were objective' and 'fair to suspects',136 
although a number of prosecutors distinguished between 'what they were supposed to be' and 
'what they actually were'.  
Our role is defined as an accusing party. However, during the criminal procedure, we should try our best to 
be fair with all cases. (APS-2 interview) 
 
                                                          
131 Field notes APU-45 & 46. 
132 Field note APU-5. 
133 Field note APU-12. 
134 The title may vary depending on different areas. In some parts of China, the main prosecutors were simply called 
'jianchaguan'. 
135 CPL 2012, Art 7, 8 and 50. 
136 Interviews APU-1, 4, 6, 13 and 5. 
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Frankly speaking, as a prosecutor in China, it is impossible to be a neutral officer. Our job is to accuse and 
charge suspects. It is very hard to be neutral, because our workload is very heavy, and we feel under pressure 
all the time. (APS-3 interview) 
 
   My observations suggested that despite the awareness of the neutral role and their legal duty 
to be 'fair' with suspects, this is not always the case. A junior prosecutor explained that he was 
shocked at the way prosecutorial interrogation 'should' be conducted. He described how, after 
his first visit with the main prosecutor in the detention centre, his supervisor taught him to 
make the suspect confess: 
At first, the suspect did not plead guilty. The prosecutor was so angry. He thumped the desk and threatened 
the suspect. Then, the suspect was scared. He said his wife was beaten up by the police. He was too angry 
to tell the truth. But eventually, he confessed and pleaded guilty. (Field-note APU-32) 
   It became apparent that the ability to subjugate suspects was an essential skill for prosecutors. 
Senior prosecutors often stereotyped suspects as 'sly and despicable'. 137  Thus, 'competent 
prosecutors' are expected to overawe suspects with their 'aura of authority' by the way they 
behave and talk.138 This image of authority is regarded as important, because 'it can make the 
suspect speak the truth', thereby processing the case in a cost-efficient manner. 139  As all 
prosecutors, both male and female, are supposed to be iron-handed when confronting the 
suspect during the interrogation, this has the effect of shaping the character of the individual. 
This point was elaborated by a senior prosecutor, who opined that female prosecutors must lose 
their femininity to become capable prosecutors:  
I don't think ladies should work as prosecutors. […] This work will cause a personality change. Just have a 
look at the able female prosecutors I know. They are all very aggressive and talk like trumpeting. […] I still 
remember A (a female prosecutor) when she was just recruited into our department, such a sweet girl! But 
now, I don't even think she is a woman. (Field-note APU-63) 
   Every prosecutorial interrogation is a test for prosecutors. In order to prove their ability to 
obtain confessions, tough cases are often handled with inappropriate determination. In a drink 
and driving case (CASE A 38) the suspect, claimed that it was his wife who had driven the car, 
and they had just swapped seats when the police found them. The prosecutor did not believe 
the story, and threatened that the suspect would 'definitely be sent to prison'. However, none of 
the evidence could prove that the suspect actually drove the car, apart from the recanted 
confession of the suspect, who alleged that it was given under the effect of intoxication. 
Nevertheless, the prosecutor still decided to charge the suspect. He sent a message to inform 
the suspect that a perjury case would be filed against his wife if he refused to plead guilty, 
which would result in both being sent to prison. Unable to cope with the pressure, the suspect 
confessed. When asked why the prosecutor persevered despite a lack of evidence, he answered: 
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According to the law, this case can be withdrawn, but our work is not just the law.140 […] Sometimes, it is 
about what I believe. […] It used to be that we were allowed to beat suspects in the interrogations. Now, it is 
a shame that we cannot. But I understand why the police beat suspects. They simply do not tell the truth. 
Those people deserve punishment, and I just want to teach them a lesson. (Field-note APU-47) 
   This account is a manifestation of force, with little concern for professionalism. Yet it is noted 
that prosecutors' use of the power available to threaten the accused who refuses to plead guilty, 
is not restricted to China. In the United States, for example, public prosecutors can charge 
suspects with draconian sentences in retaliation for their lack of cooperation.141 The Chinese 
prosecutors' decision to prosecute, as with their American counterparts, is within their 
discretion and is essentially unreviewable. Their overbearing behaviour towards suspects 
during prosecutorial interrogations suggests that there is a shared presumption of guilt between 
the police and prosecutors, in which case prosecutors are unlikely to constrain the police 
effectively. With little professional training in place, prosecutors’ endorsement and 
understanding of police malpractice is entrenched through the apprenticing of new recruits in 
the prosecutor's office.  
CONCLUSION 
The Chinese procuracy's responsibility for overseeing the enforcement of law by other criminal 
justice institutions is undoubtedly controversial in the light of democratic legal rationales. As 
an approach divergent from Western legal systems, the construction of the procuracy in China 
and its Soviet prototype were designed to facilitate the centralised Socialist authority and the 
highly controlled justice system in their particular socio-political contexts. In this perspective, 
the judiciary, the police and other legal institutions are treated equally as law enforcement 
agencies, despite their distinctive functions, whereas the procuracy, with a superior position, is 
entrusted as a guardian of justice.  This special legal status of the procuracy embodies a 
remarkable confidence of the State in the procuracy's ability in maintaining Socialist legal order 
and ensuring strict observance of law.  
   However, the role the procuracy performs in supervising other criminal justice institutions is, 
in practice, rather different from the expectation given through official rhetoric. This has been 
particularly demonstrated by the fact that prosecutors control neither the police nor the courts. 
Their oversight of the police investigation is perceived as essential to ensure quality of the 
police case and compliance with legal procedure. Nevertheless, the review of the procuracy, as 
an after-event model, is unable to direct the investigation effectually until the police inquiry is 
over, leaving the police investigation insulated from external review. More problematically, 
prosecutors' actions are driven by a concern with the presentation of investigative dossiers 
which can withstand the scrutiny of the court, rather than the actual process, or the reliability 
                                                          
140 It is noted that all prosecutors in China have the absolute power to prosecute the case; however, they have very limited 
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of the evidence produced. Since prosecutors are aligned with the police in their common 
objective of securing a conviction, their actions are geared towards shoring up the case prepared 
by the police, such as providing legal advice to cover up illegally obtained evidence, or 
procuring guilty pleas from suspects to confirm their earlier confessions gained through a range 
of oppressive tactics if necessary. Oversight in this context is helping the police conceal or 
legitimise their malpractices, even to the extent of educating them in how to falsify evidence. 
In this regard, prosecutors, by failing to intervene in the face of apparent and persistent 
procedural irregularity, are subservient to the police who are supposed to be supervised by them.  
   While the procuracy's supervisory power over the courts has in theory given rise to 
quandaries, this power has rarely been exercised to challenge a court's authority. Yet this by no 
means implies that the power of supervision has been relinquished. In fact, it has been used 
sparingly, not for the purpose of ensuring the correct application of law by the courts, but as a 
bargaining chip, both to pursue the interests of the procuracy and to maintain its authoritative 
façade. In this setting, the procuracy-court relationship is discreetly calculative, driven by the 
'hidden rules' to maximise its interests. On the one hand, the procuracy has strategically 
maintained close cooperation to obtain the support from the courts in fulfilling its institutional 
target. On the other hand, the supervisory function will be deployed, in the name of law, to 
pressurise the courts when judicial decisions are detrimental to the procuracy. The result of this 
special relationship is the impaired autonomy of the court in performing its independent 
function, which is demonstrated in judges' assistance of the procuracy in maintaining a high 
conviction rate, and the court's failure to protect the procedural rights of the defendant, even in 
public proceedings.  
   It is clear that the superior legal status derived from their supervisory function fails to 
translate into into the self-esteem of prosecutors and make them totally commit to their duties. 
Many prosecutors have experienced burnout due to high caseloads, constant time pressures, 
inadequate legal training and limited funding. With a lack of motivation, their dissatisfaction 
is sometimes vented on suspects, through aggressive demands for guilty pleas in prosecutorial 
interrogations. Their coercive-compliant interrogative style is no different from that of the 
police, casting doubt on their capacity to fulfil the supervisory role. As prosecutors fail to 
comply with rules, or safeguard the rights of suspects themselves, they are unlikely to request 
other institutions to do so. There is little doubt that the role that the procuracy plays in achieving 
the correct enforcement of law is far from having any real substance. Mainly being used as an 
asset to secure its institutional interests, the unique supervisory function of the procuracy, 
makes it an instrument of the political regime, rather than of justice. 
 
 
 
 
